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Effective Structural Relief in U.S. v. Microsoft 




The day after we filed an  Amici Curiae brief on remedies in  U.S. v. Microsoft, together 
with Roger Noll and Mike Scherer, the federal government and 17 state attorneys’ general 
(hereinafter “the government”) submitted their recommendations on relief to the Court.
1 Because 
we were not privy to the details of the government’s proposal, our analysis of remedy 
alternatives was necessarily more general and included options that were not ultimately 
embraced by the government. In its proposed final judgment, the government advocates what we 
referred to in our brief as “functional” divestiture  -- the separation of Microsoft into separate 
operating system and application software businesses  – coupled with a series of “conduct” 
remedies designed to be in place for no longer than three years following the divestiture to help 
ensure that competition in the operating systems market takes hold.
2 
We believe that functional divestiture is the minimum acceptable form of relief in this 
case, but that it nonetheless also does not promise to accomplish all of the goals to which an 
effective relief plan should aspire. A much better case can be made, in our view, for what we 
have termed a “full” divestiture of Microsoft that would build on the functional split 
recommended by the government, and then require a further divestiture of the company’s 
operating systems business into three competing firms, each with the same intellectual property 
rights in the various Windows operating systems. We are fully cognizant that a full divestiture 
would be a more complicated task than that proposed by the government. For the reasons we 
                                                 
1 See “Plaintiffs’ Proposed Final Judgment” (“PPFJ”) and “Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of 
Proposed Final Judgment,” April 28, 2000 (corrected as of May 2, 2000).  




argue in our brief to the Court, however, it not only is feasible but is the best method for ensuring 
competition in the operating systems (OS) market in which Microsoft has been found to have 
unlawfully maintained a monopoly. 
The Three Central Goals of Relief  
Before discussing the merits of the government’s proposal, it is useful to review the basic 
principles of the remedy phase of monopolization cases. Remedies in such cases generally 
incorporate one or more of the following elements: conduct restrictions, licensing, and 
restructuring. Structural relief is the most far-reaching category of remedies, but there are several 
reasons for the presumption favoring structural remedies in  monopolization cases. If the aim is to 
“terminate the monopoly”, the most straightforward solution is to break it up in some fashion. 
This is consistent with the economic view that structural relief goes to the root of the problem, 
even if the problem is m erely conduct that unlawfully maintains the monopoly. Such conduct 
would not be successful unless the underlying structure of the market in the first instance has 
been subject to monopoly, even if gained through lawful means. If there are significant reasons 
why restraining conduct or licensing remedies are not likely to be effective in undoing the 
terminating the monopoly  – reasons which we discuss in detail in our brief  – then the case for 
some sort of structural remedy is compelling.
3  
The need for structural relief in this case becomes clear when one considers the three 
central goals that a remedy must accomplish.
4 First, within a short period of time, the remedy 
should introduce workable competition into the market for Intel-compatible platforms for 
applications software. Second, the remedy should reduce the “applications barrier to entry” in 
                                                                                                                                                             
principle of division in the government’s proposal is to separate the company along programmatic lines.  
3 Id. at 26-44. 




order to establish economic conditions that are conducive to workable competition in the 
operating systems market. Third, the remedy should reduce the ability of Microsoft to project its 
current monopoly power into other markets, as a way of preventing new monopolies in those 
other markets and of inhibiting Microsoft from reinforcing its monopoly in operating systems. 
The challenge is to choose a remedy that balances these goals against the potential short-run 
disruption and risks that necessarily accompany any major structural change.
  
The Merits and Shortcomings of “Functional” Divestiture 
The merits and shortcomings of the government’s relief plan can best be judged with 
reference to the three goals that a relief measure should try to accomplish. The functional 
separation proposed by the government directly addresses the second goal of relief  – reducing 
the applications barrier to entry  – by removing both the incentives and means to raise that entry 
barrier. This is because the new applications company (“AppsCo”) should have incentives to 
develop its Office products for alternative operating systems like Linux. In addition, to the extent 
the government’s plan works a s advertised, it has a chance of introducing competition into the 
OS market, and if this occurs, then in constraining Microsoft’s ability to dominate adjacent 
markets. 
There are several drawbacks to the government’s proposal, however. Most importantly, 
the split between applications and operating systems does not  ensure that workable competition 
in the OS market  – the focus of the findings of fact and conclusions of law  – actually will 
emerge. In particular, the AppsCo may not emerge as a middleware threat  the government 
anticipates. Alternatively, even if it does  – that is, even if applications begin to be written for 
Office  -- users of PCs are still likely to need Windows as an underlying operating system to run 




have the bandwidth to do so). Then there is always the possibility  – some have claimed 
likelihood  – that AppsCo and the Windows company tacitly would agree not to invade each 
other’s turf.  
In any of  these cases, if significant competition does not emerge, then consumers could 
suffer higher prices on account of the “double monopoly” problem. This is because each of the 
two monopolies are likely to independently maximize its own profits and set prices h igher than 
would be the case in a competitive market, with correspondingly lower combined profits, than 
would be the case with an integrated monopoly (such as the present Microsoft). 
Finally, the government’s plan may not prevent Microsoft from distorting  competition in 
its drive to extend the desktop OS monopoly to the markets for operating systems used by 
servers, hand held computers, and other internet access devices. To be sure, the proposal 
anticipates this problem by imposing various conduct restrictions on the company in the three 
years following any breakup (and up to 10 years if no breakup occurs). Among other things, the 
proposal would require Microsoft not “bind” and “middleware products” to its OS unless it 
offers an identical feature of the OS t hat does not contain such additional middleware. 
Furthermore, the proposed conduct decree order would prevent the compare from interfering 
with the interoperability of other non-Microsoft middleware, while requiring the company to 
disclose its application  programming interfaces (APIs) in a timely manner to other software 
developers. 
In principle, these restrictions might inhibit Microsoft from successfully leveraging its 
desktop OS monopoly into other OS markets. In practice, however, Microsoft can take advantage 
of the inherent lags built into the decree enforcement process  – which entails trial court hearings 




be judged to have violated any of the foregoing provisions  – the meaning of each of which are 
likely to be litigated – the company may be able to secure a fait accompli, much as it has done 
with Internet Explorer and the browser market. 
Full Divestiture of the Microsoft Monopoly 
These various considerations led  us to the view that the Court should seriously examine 
what we call “full divestiture” as the best means for addressing all the remedy goals in this case. 
This remedy would contain two elements  – the functional divestiture described above, combined 
with a  dissolution of the monopoly of the operating systems. The dissolution of Windows 
monopoly would be accomplished by effectively “cloning” the current Windows division into 
two additional companies, so that three distinct firms would have a full license to a ll the 
intellectual property of Microsoft’s current OS division.  
Why the number three? The experience of having just two competitors in a market, such 
as the duopoly that used to exist in the wireless telecommunications business before the numbers 
of licenses were expanded, suggests that having only two competitors in a market is not a 
reliable protection against monopoly. Significant price and/or quality competition does not 
generally appear until there are at least three firms. Moreover, in light of the  significant barriers 
to new entry into the OS market, having three competitors provides a margin of safety. With but 
two competitors, if one stumbles and fails, the market would then revert back into a full-blown 
monopoly.  
Full divestiture would completely meet the three remedy goals in the case: 
– It would immediately (upon a final verdict) create competition in the OS market. 




could easily have a substantial impact on its sales, the three-way company split would stimulate 
price and quality competition in operating systems. 
– Full divestiture would essentially nullify the applications barrier to entry for the new 
Windows OS companies. It would not, however, reduce the barrier for new entrants into the OS 
market. The barrier would be removed for the three OS companies because, at the outset, 
developers would be able to write programs for all of the WinCos simultaneously. None of the 
WinCos could hope to exclude the other initially.
5  
–  Full divestiture would reduce any of the successor OS companies' ability to project 
monopoly power into other markets by reducing the monopoly power of the OS 
companies. For example, as we already noted, there are currently concerns that 
Microsoft is using the Windows 2000 system to extend its desktop monopoly to 
servers. In the post-full-divestiture world, if a single Windows company attempted to 
develop a system that locked users into a particular and (for users) undesirable 
linkage of  desktop and server software, the users could turn to another company for a 
different configuration. Similarly, one of the new Windows companies might decide 
to provide a variant of its Windows-compatible operating system that supported 
primarily Netscape for those users who were attracted to some features of Netscape. 
The Fragmentation Objection 
The only major criticism of the full divestiture option that we have heard is the 
assertion that it would “fragment” what is the current dominant OS standard and would lead 
                                                 
5 We see little prospect in the near term, however, of lowering the barriers to entry for other non-successor 





to incompatible systems. In the short run, fragmentation would not be a problem because 
each of the Windows companies would be the existing APIs.  
Over the longer run, given the strong economies of scale in developing operating systems 
and powerful network externalities due to consumers’ desire to have operating systems that are 
able to support large numbers of applications, there would be a powerful tendency toward a 
single OS standard. For that very reason, during some reasonable period of time f ollowing 
monopoly dissolution, it is highly likely that each of the WinCos would have strong incentives to 
remain compatible with each other  – to maintain common APIs  – so that applications software 
developers will be able to write programs for each operating system with minimum additional 
porting costs. Meanwhile, to the extent innovation in operating systems occurs, it is likely that 
new features would be added in “modular” fashion, so that the current core aspects of the 
operating system would retain their common APIs. 
Of course, there is a danger that a new monopoly OS eventually would emerge following 
dissolution. That is, one of the Windows companies might innovate so rapidly that it would 
outstrip the other two companies, producing a new and vastly superior operating system that the 
other WinCos cannot imitate or reverse engineer, and move to a position of market dominance 
similar to that of Microsoft today. It is impossible to predict whether or not a new market 
dominance would occur, but there would  be no legal objection to this scenario if the company 
were to gain market dominance through “superior skill, foresight, and industry.” However, if the 
firm were to gain market dominance through anti-competitive means, this would once again 
trigger antitrust attention, although the new Windows companies would be well aware of 





While remonopolization is a concern, it is also clear that the potential for sustained 
monopoly under the full divestiture proposal is far less than under any alternative remedy. 
Under the full divestiture remedy,  the market at least begins with a workably competitive 
structure. Therefore, compared to the current situation, or to situations with a Microsoft OS 
monopoly burdened by conduct restraints, as would occur under conduct or partial divestiture 
proposals, the full divestiture remedy has the best chance of developing a workably 
competitive market for operating systems, while encouraging a maximum degree of 
innovation. 
Furthermore, it is vital to keep in mind that divergence in operating systems is not 
necessarily harmful to consumers. What is denigrated as “fragmentation” is more accurately 
described as “product differentiation,” such as occurs in most industries in a progressive market 
economy, as for example occurs with automobiles, VCRs, communications devices, televisions, 
cameras, most computer software, pharmaceuticals, apparel, breakfast cereals, and even 
tomatoes. 
Indeed, the market for operating systems arguably has provided  insufficient product 
differentiation precisely because of Microsoft’s monopoly, the applications barrier to entry, and 
Microsoft’s unlawful conduct. The relative paucity of low-end operating systems is one example 
of insufficient product differentiation. Microsoft’s philosophy is akin to that of pre-divestiture 
AT&T, which held in effect that consumers could have any phone they wanted as long as 
Western Electric made it and its color was black. 
In o ur view, the Court should view favorably the prospect of competition and innovation 
that will lead to product differentiation in the market for operating systems. However, the 




mean that old investments  – in areas such as scythes, horse-drawn carriages, kerosene lamps, 
typewriters, vinyl records, wooden skis, black-and-white televisions, or 5 ¼ floppy disks  – 
become worthless except as antiques. Yet few are the cases where people yearn for the flickering 
light of the kerosene lamp, the scratchy sound of their 78-rpm records, or the endless pile of 
floppy disks. We should embrace the opportunity for innovation and product differentiation in 
the market for operating systems when the differentiation arises from a competitive process in 
which each OS company seeks to offer the best operating system for its target category of users. 